Technology is rapidly disrupting every industry and institution around the globe. Yet 
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") are aggressively enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") against corporations engaged in international business.
1
The FCPA was signed into law in 1978 2 and has two main purposes. First, the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions make it unlawful for certain classes of entities to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining business. 3 Second, the FCPA's accounting provisions require companies whose securities are listed in the United States to (a) make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corporation and (b) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal controls. The table below graphs the total monetary sanctions imposed on organizations under the FCPA by year in U.S. Dollars; the values are adjusted for inflation: 9 Id. 10 Brian S. Haney, FCPA Clearinghouse (2018) (the information contained in this chart was prepared by the author with information from Stanford University's FCPA website as a research assistant for Professor Veronica Root) (on file with author). See also Appendix A for complete table of FCPA prosecutions by year; id.
11 STAN. L. SCH., supra note 5. 14 Both the rate of growth in the number of prosecutions and the total monetary sanctions imposed under the FCPA are trending up at an accelerating rate. 15 As a result of heavy fines and penalties associated with these increased prosecution efforts, companies have been forced to change the way they approach compliance and ethics. 16 Now compliance is king, and its subjects, regulators, prosecutors, courts, and corporations, are quick to tout its power for potential good. 17 The growing importance of FCPA compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental actors, like the DOJ and SEC, place on the need for institutions to adopt effective compliance programs. 18 Indeed, the DOJ has made 13 Inflation rates were calculated using an online inflation calculator. See Inflation Calculator, SAVING.ORG, https://www.saving.org/inflation/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) . See also Brian S. Haney, FCPA Clearinghouse (2018) (the information contained in this chart was prepared by the author with information from Stanford University's FCPA website as a research assistant for Professor Veronica Root) (on file with author); id.
explicitly clear that prosecution of corporate crime is a high priority. 19 And, the DOJ has explained that prosecution of corporate crime is a vital element of protecting the public interest. 20 For example, in 2014 the Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice's Criminal Division explained that the work of compliance officials serves to protect the integrity of our public markets, the country's financial systems, intellectual property, and taxpayer dollars. 21 Therefore, corporations have begun to focus on strengthening their internal compliance programs. 22 To illustrate, in 2014 the President and CEO of Walmart Stores, in the midst of a stunning bribery scandal, discussed the company's goal to become the model of excellence in global compliance and ethics. 23 Further, the President and CEO of Walmart International explained that "[a]s a global company, we have responsibilities to the countries in which we operate. We earn trust through our commitment to compliance."
24
A corporation engaged in FCPA misconduct can be sure regulators will point to an ineffective compliance program as a cause of misconduct.
25
However, developing a robust compliance program poses problems for many firms because, in short, compliance is a complicated, time consuming, and expensive process.
26
This Article presents an algorithm firms may use to improve the cost-efficiency of their compliance programs, proceeding in three parts. Part I explores various sources of guidance for evaluating compliance programs. Part II introduces an algorithm firms may use to measure compliance programs quantitatively. Part III explains how the algorithm introduced in Part II can be used by firms to improve the quality and costefficiency of their compliance programs.
I. SOURCES OF GUIDANCE
The Government has made multiple resources available to corporations interested in developing robust compliance programs. First, the DOJ provides guidance on how agency officials evaluate compliance programs in the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs Memo ("DOJ Memo").
27
The DOJ Memo provides a list of eleven factors, known as the Filip Factors, that the DOJ may consider when evaluating corporate compliance programs. The eleven factors are: Therefore, it is important for firms to draw on multiple sources of guidance in constructing their compliance programs.
Second, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations ("Principles of Prosecution") provide guidance for companies regarding the DOJ's expectations for corporate compliance programs.
31
The Principles of Prosecution explain that federal prosecutors should consider "the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's pre-existing compliance program" when deciding whether to charge a corporation or negotiating a settlement agreement. is not sufficient to justify not charging a corporation for criminal conduct." 33 However, prosecutors and courts consider the existence of such programs in determining whether the employee engaged in misconduct acted in accordance with the will of the firm or independently. 34 Therefore, firms are able to insulate themselves from potential lethal liability under the FCPA by implementing and maintaining effective compliance programs. 35 Further, the Principles of Prosecution provide detailed guidance on what constitutes an effective compliance program.
36
The Principles of Prosecution state that two critical factors in evaluating compliance programs are 1) whether the program is designed to maximize effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees; and 2) whether corporate management is enforcing the program or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business objectives.
37
Additionally, prosecutors will consider the design of the compliance program, whether the program is maintained in good faith, and the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the compliance program when making prosecution and settlement decisions. 38 Therefore, one important task for prosecutors is to determine whether a corporation's compliance program is merely a "paper program."
39
As a result, firms must make sure that their policies and procedures accurately describe the way in which their employees behave. And, it is critical compliance officials work with employees when writing policies and procedures to ensure organizational policies and procedures are well understood and followed.
A third source of guidance for compliance programs is the United States Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations ("Sentencing Guidelines"), which are applied by prosecutors when sentencing organizations.
40
The Sentencing Guidelines specifically state that "the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program" is a factor that will mitigate the ultimate punishment of a defendant.
41
In defining an 33 Id. § 0-28.800. 34 United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979 Pfizer made these payments to improperly influence government decisions regarding the approval and regulation of Pfizer pharmaceutical products.
56
In sum, Pfizer paid more than $2 million in fines and reaped more than $7 million in profits as a result of its bribes. 57 However, these improper payments resulted in a $15 million dollar fine levied against Pfizer.
58
Pfizer's DPA required a complete overhaul of the company's FCPA compliance program and included nine specific minimum elements:
1. A clearly articulated corporate policy against violations of the FCPA.
2. Promulgation of compliance standards and procedures designed to reduce the prospect of violations of the FCPA.
3. The assignment of a senior executive to be responsible for the implementation of the new compliance program.
4. Implementation of mechanisms designed to ensure that the policies and procedures of the new program are clearly communicated to employees.
5. The creation of an effective reporting system for suspected compliance failures or criminal conduct.
6. The application of appropriate disciplinary procedures to address FCPA compliance violations.
7. The implementation of proper due diligence policies for Pfizer's business partners.
8. The implementation of standard contractual terms in all agreements designed to protect against violations of the FCPA. 9. Periodic testing of the new compliance program.
59
Another example of a settlement agreement which provides guidance for compliance programs is the guilty plea agreement between BAE Systems ("BAE") and the DOJ. In 2010, BAE pleaded guilty to making false statements regarding its FCPA program.
60
BAE's misconduct began in 2000, when BAE engaged in significant expansion into the United States market. 61 As part of that expansion, BAE represented to the Department of Defense ("DOD") and DOJ that it would create a compliance program to ensure that its domestic and international business operations would conform to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. 62 Yet, in 2002 rumors began circulating that BAE had been awarded contracts for fighter jets with several Eastern European countries through bribing public officials.
63
As a result of these rumors, the DOD asked for BAE's assurance that BAE had complied with the FCPA anti-bribery provisions in procuring the awards.
64
In response, BAE stated that it had reformed its business practices and implemented sufficient mechanisms to ensure that all of its businesses were operating in compliance with the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. 65 However, this was false.
66
BAE's guilty plea agreement imposed a $400,000,400 fine against BAE, one of the largest fines ever levied under the FCPA.
67
BAE's plea agreement with the DOJ required BAE to implement and maintain a compliance program that includes a system of internal accounting controls designed to ensure BAE makes and keeps fair and accurate books, records, and accounts; a rigorous anti-corruption compliance code; and standards and procedures designed to detect and deter violations of the 59 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 54. Feb. 22, 2010 FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws. 68 Further, BAE agreed to secure the services of an independent monitor of the program for a three-year period to ensure the effective implementation of the compliance program.
69
According to the plea agreement, the monitor's primary responsibility is to assess and monitor BAE's compliance with the terms of the plea agreement and specifically reduce the risk of any recurrence of BAE's misconduct, including an evaluation of BAE's FCPA compliance.
70
The United States Attorneys Manual Insert on FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy ("Enforcement Policy") is a fifth source of guidance for FCPA compliance programs.
71
The Enforcement Policy is aimed at providing additional benefits to companies based upon their behavior after discovering misconduct. 72 Indeed, if a company behaves in accordance with the Enforcement Policy following the discovery of a compliance failure, the DOJ will recommend a 50% reduction off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range, with limited exception.
73
The Enforcement Policy requires that companies implement an effective compliance and ethics program to receive the benefits of the Enforcement Policy. 74 Further, the Enforcement Policy defines several criteria to illustrate the properties of an effective compliance program.
75
These criteria include: employee awareness of company compliance policies and procedures, the dedication of adequate resources to compliance, the quality and experience of compliance personnel, the authority and independence of the company's compliance function, auditing of the company's compliance function; appropriate disciplinary procedures for compliance failures, appropriate retention of business records, and any additional steps to demonstrate a company's commitment to promoting and maintaining a culture of respect for compliance and ethics.
76
These five sources of guidance may be used by firms to inform decision making when developing a corporate compliance and ethics program. Further, by drawing 68 Letter from U.S. Dep't of Justice Criminal Div., Fraud Section, to Lawrence Byrne, Esq., Counsel for BAE Systems PLC (Feb. 4, 2010) on multiple sources of guidance, firms can develop robust compliance programs tailored to their individual needs. Indeed, firms can proactively insulate themselves from the liability risks associated with compliance failure in a cost-efficient manner by focusing on the criteria analyzed by the DOJ, SEC, federal prosecutors, and courts in developing and maintaining their compliance and ethics programs.
II. QUALITY MEASUREMENT ALGORITHM
Part I of this Article explored five sources of guidance for measuring the quality and effectiveness of a compliance program. Part II consolidates the information from the five sources of guidance in Part I to develop an algorithm for the measurement of compliance program quality.
Quality Metrics
Quality metrics are measurement tools that enable subjective quality assessment to be measured within a formalized framework.
77
In this context quality is not a single idea, but rather a multidimensional concept, which includes an entity and the measurable quality factors of that entity. 78 And, the ability to measure quality is critical to the modernization of in-house legal departments, compliance departments, and law firms because it facilitates the improvement of efficiency and performance. 79 Further, quality metrics present a framework that facilitates a more direct mapping of the reasons behind expert analysis. 80 Indeed, quality metrics seek to uncover the reasons for expert scores and model them accordingly.
81
Several quality factors are important and must be combined to develop an overall quality assessment for a particular entity when measuring quality in any given situation. 82 Additionally, quality metric analysis allows for the discovery of strengths and weaknesses at both the macro and component level. 83 However, quality metrics must do three things to be effective. First, quality metrics must be practical and implementable to the parties expected to produce them. 84 Second, quality metrics must be objective, transparent, mathematical measurements. 85 Third, quality metrics must correlate to the consumer's subjective interpretation of quality.
86
Ultimately, the main objective of implementing quality assessment metrics is to develop measures that are consistent with subjective evaluation.
87
The goal of a compliance program evaluation is to assess the quality of the compliance program and to identify areas of improvement to prevent future misconduct.
88
However, this task is difficult without a proper framework for evaluation. Organizations and agencies will be able to evaluate compliance programs in a more cost-efficient manner by establishing a standard set of compliance program quality metrics. 89 Hence, once a set of compliance quality factors are defined, a human indexer may then evaluate each of the factors independently based on her professional experience.
90
Scoring mechanisms may then be put in place to mathematically model and calculate the quality of a compliance program. The compliance program evaluation process is describable algorithmically, simplifying and standardizing the evaluation process.
Algorithm for Compliance Program Evaluation
Generally, an algorithm is a sequence of instructions executed to transform some input of information to an output of information.
91
In the context of compliance program evaluation, the goal of quality measurement algorithms is to define input criteria as objectively as possible, and to transform that input information into a useful output informing human decision makers in their evaluation processes. This part of the Article draws on the sources of guidance in Part I, as well as the basic principles of quality metrics to present an algorithm for the evaluation of corporate compliance programs. These nine factors are largely derived from the Filip Factors outline in the DOJ memo.
93
The second step is weighting the defined evaluation factors based on their relative importance.
94
Indeed, each evaluation factor may not be considered equal in an overall evaluation of a compliance program. So, each factor may be raised to an exponent greater than or equal to one to represent its relative importance among the other evaluation factors. For example, suppose Senior and Middle Management and Third Party Management are particularly important in a specific evaluation. In that case, those important factors should be weighted to an exponent of 2, while the other factors are raised to an exponent of 1. The should be scored in terms of the number of evaluation factor criteria the compliance program satisfies. The evaluation factor criteria must be measureable and may be reflective of tangible qualities. The table below draws upon the sources of guidance described in Part I and includes a list of five evaluation factor criteria for each evaluation factor to measure compliance programs:
Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria
Remediation This table is meant to be illustrative and may be adapted, updated, or changed before implementation.
The fourth step in the algorithm is for a human indexer to gather and record evaluation information for each of the evaluation factors.
143
To do this, the human indexer must score each evaluation factor based upon the number of evaluation factor criteria an organization's compliance program satisfies. The table below Each evaluation factor may then be given a score calculated by dividing the number of satisfied evaluation factor criteria by the total number of evaluation factor criteria. So, in the hypothetical above, the Remediation of Underlying Conduct evaluation factor would receive a score of .800; calculated as 4, the number of satisfied evaluation factor criteria, divided by 5, the total number of evaluation factor criteria.
Calculating a weighted geometric mean for the compliance program is the fifth step.
144
The weighted geometric mean allows the algorithm to produce an overall score that when measured on a relative basis, is well suited to capture human intuition in quality analysis.
145
The weighted geometric mean represents an overall evaluation of a company's compliance program in a numerical score from zero to one.
146
The weighted geometric mean calculation can be described formally with the equation:
In the above equation C is the overall compliance score. Additionally, n represents the number of evaluation factors, F i , and W i , is the per factor weight.
148
The square root is a summation equation designed to calculate the total weight for all of the factors. In other words, the equation above represents a mathematically formalistic way of expressing that the product of all the weighted factors is calculated and is then squared to the n th root, where n is the sum of the exponents of all the factors.
149
For illustrative purposes the Using the information in the table above, the company's compliance score could be calculated in the following way:
= . 8 × .6 × .6 × .4 × 1 × 1 × .8 × .2 × .8 × .8 × 1
So, in this example the company's overall compliance score is .668. Practically applied, the closer a compliance score is to 1, the better the quality of the compliance program. Conversely, the closer the compliance score is to 0, the lower the quality of the compliance program. For example, a compliance program with a score of .808 is of better quality than a compliance program with a score of .556.
Properties
The algorithm uses the weighted geometric mean to calculate the compliance score as opposed to an arithmetic mean, coefficient variables, addition, or another method of score determination due the geometric mean's properties.
150
The algorithm includes seven distinct properties as a result of the weighted geometric mean calculation.
151
These properties are designed to reflect properties of human intuition in decision making.
152
The first property that the algorithm includes is an ordered ranking that balances trade-offs between various criteria.
153
Next is the property that the algorithm is heterogeneous because it is able to accommodate and combine different types of data.
154
The third property that the algorithm includes is a filter property; which means that if any evaluation factor receives a score of zero, the total score is zero.
155
The filter property allows for the identification of unacceptable compliance for any one evaluation factor. Normalized scoring is the fourth property that the algorithm includes.
156
In other words, all factors are assigned a normalized score between 0 and 1. 157 Fifth, the algorithm includes a hierarchy property.
158
Hierarchical scoring allows sub-scores to be derived and treated as atomic scores, or for atomic scores to be decomposed into smaller elements without impacting the way the characteristic is used.
159
The sixth property that the algorithm includes is a linear diagonal.
160
The linear diagonal allows any two factors relationship to be graphed along a diagonal of a plot. 161 Finally, the seventh property that the algorithm includes is weightability, meaning it can account for the relative importance of each factor of consideration.
162
In sum, these seven properties allow for the algorithm to model human intuition in quality analysis. 163 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS
The former compliance counsel at the DOJ has repeatedly commented on the lack of internal assessment and data generation by organizations with regard to their internal compliance efforts. 164 Indeed, it is critical firms begin to change their approach to compliance to maximize the cost-efficiency with which they operate. Compliance programs are tasked with serving three distinct functions within an organization. Prevention is the first function, which involves the company's actions to prevent compliance failures from occurring within the organization.
165
Second is detection, which involves the organization's actions aimed at identifying misconduct, risks, or errors.
166
The third function is remediation, which involves an organization's strategies for responding to and recovering from misconduct.
167
Executing these three functions requires the work of multiple compliance personnel working together to ensure the effective pursuit of a corporation's compliance goals. Companies can use the algorithm provided in Part II to improve each of the three functions compliance programs serve. Organizations can use the algorithm to improve the prevention function because the algorithm includes proactive solutions to prevent compliance failures: the evaluation factor criteria. The evaluation factor criteria were derived from the five sources of guidance discussed in Part I. Therefore, the algorithm measures the quality of a compliance program based upon the key factors that the DOJ and courts consider in their evaluations of compliance programs. Further, companies can use the algorithm to implement preventative compliance procedures designed specifically to improve the key factors that DOJ and courts use to evaluate compliance programs. In other words, the evaluation factor criteria serve both as measurement tools and, when implemented, preventative compliance mechanisms. For example, if a company has a low score under the Senior and Middle Management factor, the company can identify the evaluation factor criteria it failed to satisfy. Then, the company can implement procedures associated with the unsatisfied criteria, on paper and in practice, to decrease the probability of a future compliance failure. Thus, a company can use the algorithm to directly improve its prevention function because the algorithm consolidates several sources of Government compliance guidance to include specific recommendations for preventative improvements.
In addition, firms can use the algorithm presented in Part II to improve the detection function because the algorithm is designed to aid compliance officials in identifying areas of weakness in compliance programs. One reason that quality metrics are important to the algorithm is that they allow for analysis of compliance programs at the component level. The ability to analyze the specific components of a compliance program supports the detection function in two ways. First, analyzing specific procedures at the component level allows companies to detect weaknesses and high-risk areas in their compliance program. For example, if a company receives a relatively low score in the Senior and Middle Management evaluation factor, the algorithm has aided in detection of an area of compliance weakness and risk. Second, analyzing specific procedures at the component level helps companies ensure that their compliance program is not merely a paper program. The algorithm supports this analysis by requiring companies demonstrate they follow their written procedures to satisfy individual evaluation factor criteria. Thus, the algorithm aids in the detection of employee behavior that is not in accordance with company procedure.
In that respect, firms can use the algorithm to improve the remediation function proactively. As Professor Veronica Root argues, firms often act irrationally in the compliance space by acting reactively as opposed to proactively. 170 And, while corporations may take steps to maximize their level of compliance with the FCPA, perfect compliance is impossible to assure. 171 Thus, one critical role of compliance personnel is to minimize risk by ensuring the company is insulated from strict enforcement penalties in the event of a compliance failure.
172
The most effective way for compliance personnel to meet this objective is to maintain an effective compliance program.
173
For instance, the Principles of Prosecution require federal prosecutors to take account of the existence and effectiveness of a company's preexisting compliance program when deciding whether to prosecute a corporate offender and during settlement discussions.
174
Further, the Sentencing Guidelines provide that an effective compliance program is a mitigating factor in the punishment of corporate defendants. 175 Hence, the most significant way in which firms can insulate themselves from liability under the FCPA, and for compliance failures generally, is to demonstrate a commitment to an ethical culture by developing a robust compliance program. Additionally, the algorithm presented in Part II provides a cost-efficient way for doing so.
Therefore, the algorithm supports each of the three functions compliance programs serve. First, the algorithm supports the prevention function by including proactive solutions to prevent compliance failures. Next, the algorithm supports the detection function by facilitating compliance officials' ability to analyze the specific components of a compliance program. Finally, the algorithm supports the remediation function by proactively aiding the program's effectiveness. Further, the evaluation factor criteria support each of these three functions indirectly. For example, the remediation function is improved if a company implements the evaluation factor criteria: "The company has written procedures to identify and analyze the root cause of misconduct when it occurs; and the company has 170 Root, supra note 1. demonstrated that it follows those procedures." 176 Thus, a compliance program that has written procedures in place to identify and analyze the root cause of misconduct when it occurs and is able to demonstrate that it follows those procedures is more likely to receive favorable treatment if under investigation by the DOJ.
177
The algorithm presented in Part II takes account of the specific considerations that prosecutors are required to consider under the Principles of Prosecution. For example, prosecutors should consider whether a compliance program is legitimate or merely a paper program.
178
The algorithm takes account of this consideration by requiring that companies demonstrate that they follow their procedures to satisfy evaluation factor criteria. 179 Additionally, the algorithm takes account of the seven detailed requirements of an effective compliance program defined in the Sentencing Guidelines. For instance, the Sentencing Guidelines require effective compliance programs exercise proper due diligence and screening in their hiring practices. 180 And, the algorithm takes account of this requirement under the Autonomy and Resources evaluation factor by including the evaluation factor criteria: "[t]he company has written procedures that require due diligence investigation prior to the hiring of new employees; and the company has demonstrated that it follows those procedures." 181 Therefore, while companies cannot use the algorithm to ensure perfect compliance; companies can use the algorithm to ensure that if a compliance failure does occur, the DOJ will work with the company, instead of against it during the remediation process.
CONCLUSION
Organizations with complex corporate structures should adopt strategies for developing comprehensive compliance processes that aggregate data across information silos.
182
Indeed, the purpose of the algorithm provided in this Article seeks to serve exactly that goal: improving firm compliance generally by allowing firms to structure their compliance data in a standardized format. Further, the algorithm allows for data to be collected, structured, and analyzed, so that firms can 176 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. more specifically monitor their compliance efforts and correlate those efforts with firm performance.
Importantly, the algorithm also supports the cost efficiency of corporate compliance programs by utilizing a framework based upon the Government's published sources of compliance guidance.
183
Following this framework allows companies to target their compliance spending and direct resources at the factors that are most important to the Government, which supports the maximization of costeffective risk reduction. In sum, Part I provided insight into sources of guidance the DOJ and courts use when evaluating the effectiveness of a corporate compliance program. Part II introduced an algorithm that firms can use to support compliance program analysis. Part III described how the algorithm can be used by organizations to maximize compliance cost-efficiency by improving the compliance functions of prevention, detection, and remediation.
